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WARRING_PIECES


                                     February 14, 2005


                                                         WAR_AND_PEACE

Quoting from Tolstoy's
"War and Peace" (1865-1869):                         One of his main themes,
                                                     against the romantic
                                                     idea of the hero,
                                                     against the Great Man
                                                     theory of history.


     The ancients have left us model
     heroic poems in which the heroes
     furnish the whole interest of the
     story, and we are still unable to
     accustom ourselves to the fact that
     for our epoch histories of that kind
     are meaningless.

       Book X, Chapter XIX p.459 (WC)



     Strange as at first glance it may seem to suppose that
     the Massacre of St. Batholomew was not due to Charles
     IX's will, though he gave the order for it and thought
     it was done as a result of that order; and strange as
     it may seem to suppose that the slaughter of eighty
     thousand men at Borodino' was not due to Napoleon's
     will, though he ordered the commencement and conduct
     of the battle and thought it was done because he
     ordered it; strange as these suppositions appear, yet
     human dignity -- which tells me that each of us is, if
     not more, at least not less a man than the great
     Napoleon -- demands the acceptance of that solution of
     the question, and historic investigation abundantly
     confirms it.

     At the battle of Borodino' Napoleon shot at no one and
     killed no one.  That was all done by the soldiers.
     Therefore it was not he who killed people.   ...

     Had Napoleon then forbidden them to fight the Russians,
     they would have killed him and have proceeded to fight
     the Russians because it was inevitable.

       Book X, Chapter XXVIII, p. 498 (WC)



     Even before he gave that order the thing he did not
     desire, and for which he only gave the order because he
     thought it was expected of him, was being done.  And he
     fell back into that artificial realm of imaginary
     greatness, and again -- as a horse walking a treadmill
     thinks it is doing something for itself -- he
     submissively fulfilled the cruel, sad, gloomy, and
     inhuman role predestined for him.

     And not for that day and hour alone were the mind and
     conscience of this man darkened on whom the
     responsibility for what was happening lay more than on
     all the others who took part in it.  Never to the end
     of his life could he understand goodness, beauty, or
     truth, or the significance of his actions, which were
     too contrary to goodness and truth, too remote from
     everything human, for him ever to be able to grasp
     their meaning.  He could not disavow his actions,
     belauded as they were by half the world, and so he had
     to repudiate truth, goodness, and all humanity.

       Book X, Chapter XXXVIII, p. 540 (WC)
       About Napoleon.  (Reminiscent of Bush Jr?)




     To study the skillful tactics and aims of Napoleon and
     his army from the time it entered Moscow till it was
     destroyed, is like studying the dying leaps and
     shudders of a mortally wounded animal.  ...
     During the whole of that period Napoleon, who seems to
     us to have been the leader of all those movements -- as
     the figurehead of a ship may seem to a savage to guide
     the vessel -- acted like a child who, holding a couple
     of strings inside a carriage, thinks he is driving it.

       Book XIII, Chapter X, p. 253 (WC)



     ... in 1812, the French gain a victory near
     Moscow.  Moscow is taken and after that, with no
     further battles, it is not Russia that ceases to
     exist, but the French army of six hundred
     thousand, and then Napoleonic France itself.

     [...]

     The period of the campaign of 1812 from the battle
     of Borodino' to the expulsion of the French proved
     that the winning of a battle does not produce a
     conquest and is not even an invariable indication
     of conquest, it proved that the force which
     decides the fate of peoples lies not in the
     conquerors, nor even in armies and battles, but in
     something else.

     The French historians, describing the condition of
     the French army before it left Moscow, affirm that
     all was in order in the Grand Army, except the
     cavalry, the artillery, and the transport -- there
     was no forage for the horses or the cattle.  That
     was a misfortune no one could remedy, for the
     peasants of the district burnt their hay rather
     than let the French have it.

     The victory gained did not bring the usual results
     because the peasants  ...  did not bring their hay
     to Moscow for the high price offered them, but
     burnt it instead.

       Book XIV, Chapter I, p286



     And it is well for a people who do not -- as the
     French did in 1813 -- salute according to all the
     rules of art, and presenting the hilt of their
     rapier gracefully and politely hand it to their
     magnanimous conqueror, but at the moment of
     trial, without asking what rules others have
     adopted in similar cases, simply and easily pick
     up the first cudgel that comes to hand, and strike
     with it till the feeling of resentment and revenge
     in their soul yields to a feeling of contempt and
     compassion.

       Book XIV, Chapter I, p287



     ... it is unintelligible why the defeat of an
     army -- a hundredth part of a nation -- should
     oblige that whole nation to submit.

       Book XIV, Chapter I, p285
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